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S E R G E Y  B R A T U S ,  I V Á N  A R C E ,  M I C H A E L  E .  L O C A S T O ,  A N D  S T E F A N O  Z A N E R O 
Offensive security—or, in plain English, the practice of  exploitation—has greatly enhanced our understanding of what it means for com-puters to be trustworthy. Having grown from hacker conventions 
that fit into a single room into a distinct engineering discipline in all but 
the name, offensive computing has so far been content with a jargon and an 
informal “hacker curriculum.” Now that it is unmistakably an industry, and 
an engineering specialization, it faces the challenge of defining itself as one, 
in a language that is understood beyond its own confines—most importantly, 
by makers of law and policy. 
Currently, lawmakers and policy-makers have no choice but to operate with pieces of our 
professional jargon that have been publicized by journalists. But writing laws based on pro-
fessional jargon is dangerous: This jargon will be misunderstood by lawmakers and judges 
alike. It’s not the wisdom of the judge or the legislator that is in question, it’s their ability to 
guess the course of a discipline years in advance. 
Consider the concept of unauthorized access at the heart of (and criminalized by) the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). The unanticipated, “unauthorized” uses of today will 
be primary uses or business models of tomorrow. When CFAA was written, connecting to 
a computer on which one had no account was pointless. Cold-calling a server could serve 
no legitimate purpose, as no servers were meant for random members of the public; each 
computer had its relatively small and well-defined set of authorized users. Then the World 
Wide Web happened, and connecting to computers without any kind of prior authorization 
became not just the norm but also the foundation of all related business. Yet the law stands as 
written then, and now produces conundrums such as whether port scans, screen-scraping, 
or URL crafting are illegal, or even whether telling journalists of a successful URL-crafting 
trick that revealed their email addresses could be a felony (as in the recent US v. Auern-
heimer case). Even accessing your own data on a Web portal in a manner unforeseen by the 
portal operator—as in the case of ApplyYourself users who could see their admission status 
prematurely—may similarly be a crime under CFAA (for discussion of these cases and differ-
ent institutions’ reactions to them, see [14]). 
Lawmaking with regard to offensive security artifacts has already started. Article 6 of the 
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime requires signatories to issue laws that criminalize 
“production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise making available 
of…a device, including a computer program, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose 
of committing any of the offences” it established as criminal; Germany and UK have since 
enacted laws targeting so-called “hacking tools.” Although, to the best of our knowledge, 
no prosecution of security researchers has yet taken place under these laws, they have had 
nontrivial chilling effects. More recently, intrusion software has been categorized by the 
December 2013 Wassenaar Arrangement as dual use technology subject to exports control; 
such software is defined as capable of “extraction of data or information, from a computer 
or network capable device, or the modification of system or user data or modification of the 
standard execution path of a program or process in order to allow the execution of externally 
provided instructions.” This is, of course, what debuggers and hypervisors do, not to mention 
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all varieties of JTAGs; although the document further stipulates that “‘Intrusion software’ 
does not include any…hypervisors, debuggers, or Software Reverse Engineering (SRE) tools,” 
the above functional description fits them perfectly. 
Such language demonstrates the challenge we face. As native speakers of the jargon, we 
understand that an exploit, a rootkit, and a defensive module that inserts itself into a piece of 
software are all likely to use the same technique of reliably composing their own code with 
the target’s; however, lawmakers do not see their unity. 
Will jailbreaking or composition beyond well-defined APIs such as DLL injection survive 
these challenges? Many sufficiently advanced techniques in both defense and exploitation 
perform some of a debugger’s or linker’s tasks without being either debuggers or linkers; 
new debugging and dynamic linking techniques are informed by exploitation. For example, 
BlackIce Defender, the first Windows firewall, linked itself into the kernel by “modifying the 
standard execution path” to defend the system, and even patented the technique that many 
rootkits have since rediscovered; Robert Graham tells the story in “The Debate over Evil 
Code” [2]. “Bring Your Own Linker” has long been a composition pattern for both offense and 
defense [1]. 
Proposals for stricter regulation of exploits are not hard to come by. A good example is pro-
vided by Stockton and Golabek-Goldman [3], which makes an aggressive and ill-informed 
call for regulation (and spells øday with a symbol for “empty set”). It defines “weaponized” on 
its first page to mean “disrupt, disable, or destroy computer networks and their components” 
and then on the next page claims that “Criminals buy and use weaponized øday exploits to 
steal passwords, intellectual property, and other data,” even though disabling or destroying a 
compromised computer in order to steal passwords or secrets is counterproductive; in fact, it 
would be just plain stupid, as it would alert the victim of the breach and likely eliminate the 
value of stolen passwords or data. Apparent lack of familiarity with the field, however, doesn’t 
stop the authors from calling for prosecution of security researchers under the CFAA—a law so 
broad and vague that prominent legal scholars argue it should be void for  vagueness [15] . 
If anything, we can expect more laws and regulations on the basic artifacts of our profession. 
The only way for us to avoid overly broad formulations that would snare every technique we 
use is to develop a language that puts offensive computing in perspective with other com-
puter engineering. 
In short, we need textbooks and textbook definitions that describe offensive computing so 
that policy-makers need neither puzzle over jargon nor design their own language—both 
approaches being potentially disastrous to the future state of practical computer security. 
Why Offensive Computing Matters for  
Security in General
If you shame attack research, you misjudge its contribution. Offense and defense 
aren’t peers. Defense is offense’s child. —John Lambert [4] 
Exploitation is programming. It is the kind of programming that every programmer should, 
if not directly practice, at least understand in terms of its capabilities and limits, because it 
will be practiced on his code. Our security is only as good as our understanding of this kind of 
programming, because it’s the essential nature of general-purpose systems (or perhaps of all 
rich enough computing systems) to allow a myriad of other execution paths than merely the 
intended ones. Until all possible latent, unintended execution models are understood, they 
can neither be eliminated nor triaged. 
Security and trustworthiness of code means attackers’ inability to program it. In computer 
science theory, we emphasize results that show what can and cannot be programmed; in 
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fact, our very notions of computer architectures derive from 
these results. Programmers and designers of a trusted system 
must be equally focused on what can and cannot be programmed 
on (or against) their code, no less than a theorist is concerned 
with what can and cannot be computed by particular execution 
models, type systems, automatic theorem provers, verifiers, and 
the like. 
The strongest kind of trust in systems security, just as in cryp-
tography, derives from some programs provably not existing—or 
at least from their existence being highly unlikely. Ciphers are 
only trusted because no efficient algorithms to solve certain 
algebraic problems are believed to exist. Cryptographic proto-
cols are only deemed trustworthy when no sequence of attacker 
manipulations of their messages can interfere with their trans-
actions, and so on. 
To stress the role of anticipating and precluding attackers’ 
programs in the realm of cryptographic protocols, Anderson and 
Needham call the protocol designers’ task programming Satan’s 
computer: 
In effect, [the protocol designer’s] task is to program 
a computer which gives answers which are subtly and 
maliciously wrong at the most inconvenient possible 
moment… and we hope that the lessons learned from 
programming Satan’s computer may be helpful in 
tackling the more common problem of programming 
Murphy’s. [5] 
For applied systems tasks, the primitives of adversarial pro-
gramming may be different, but the essence of trustworthiness 
is the same: Such attacker programming must fail, preferably 
due to the provable impossibility of certain tasks. 
We can trust any system only so far as we understand its 
unintended programming models (so-called “weird machines” 
[6], building on prior work by many others, such as Gerardo 
Richarte’s About Exploits Writing [7]) and their limits. Exploits 
are merely artifacts and expressions of this understanding; the 
essence of the discipline is the skill to discover, validate, and gen-
eralize such models. Yet no research activity can develop without 
free exchange of its artifacts, and the discipline of systems secu-
rity needs to develop a lot further before we can trust it even to 
the same extent as we trust analysis of cryptographic protocols. 
Exploits are the primary tools in exploring the unexpected, 
latent models of programming that are inherent in the ways we 
currently build computing systems. Thus, we must be able to 
speak about them in all their unity and differences, and to be 
understood. 
Exploits: Research or Development?  
Proof-of-Concept or “Weaponized”?
Compared with software engineering, arguably its most closely 
related field, security focuses much less on its engineering 
process. Unlike software engineering, which continually invents 
new processes and methodologies, and has an industry-wide 
shared vocabulary for the outcomes of different process stages 
(such as “design,” “architecture,” “prototype,” “alpha-,” “beta-,” 
“production quality,” etc.), the security industry does not appear 
concerned with defining its process or its product through the 
stages of its development and maturity. 
Terms occasionally used to qualify important industry artifacts, 
such as exploits, do not appear to have consensus definitions. 
Perhaps the best example is the use of “weaponized” [8] to refer to 
a certain grade of readiness or effectiveness (or ease-of-use?) that 
must inspire awe in the prospective buyer (note also how such 
use in turn affects misuse in policy proposals, as quoted above). 
Even terms purely technical in origin raise questions regard-
ing their usefulness, for example, the use of “memory corrup-
tion” in advisories [9]. Even the typically used term remote code 
execution is somewhat ambiguous, because it obscures whether 
introduction of external code by a remote party is necessary or 
whether full control is achievable by manipulating the platform’s 
existing code, with remotely crafted data inputs acting as the de 
facto exploit program. 
It gets worse when we get to characterizing intentions of a 
particular research or engineering activity. Suppose some 
lawmakers would like to protect security research results while 
attempting to curb what they see as software developed with 
ill intent. Our industry’s language, however, lacks the ability to 
clearly distinguish research results from engineering artifacts. 
An in-depth technical description of a software vulnerability 
may or may not be equivalent to an actual exploit program that 
leverages said vulnerability. How much detail and analysis do 
you need to consider the two equivalent? Is it possible to regulate 
one but not the other? And, if so, to regulate what exactly? 
Even though there is a lot of architecting, programming, and 
testing involved in producing what could be called a “commercial 
grade exploit”—all activities that can be more closely associated 
with software engineering than with research as such—this 
nuance seems to be lost on much of the security industry, and 
certainly on the outside world, which speaks of “vulnerabilities,” 
“PoCs,” “triggers,” “payloads,” and “weaponized exploits” as if 
they were interchangeable. Given such usage, the difference 
between an open source research tool and a commercially backed 
software product that includes exploits is too nuanced to explain 
(see, e.g., Iván Arce’s RSA 2005 presentation [10] on the subject). 
All the more so, a “textbook” gradation of exploits with respect to 
their power and reliability is necessary. As a direct consequence 
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of such a gradation, an evaluation of effort necessary to elevate 
privilege from any given exploit achievement becomes desirable. 
In other words, it is not enough for a customer of an engineering 
effort to know that a product or design is flawed; one might want 
to know how deeply the rabbit hole goes. 
In plain English, what does it mean for software to withstand a 
particular kind of adversarial audit or testing? Once a vulnera-
bility has been found, how general is its description as presented 
in an advisory or an exploit? Does the description need to capture 
an entire class of related vulnerabilities or merely a particular 
instance of an exploitable bug? How far should an exploitable bug 
be pursued by the researcher beyond the creation of code that 
exploits a particular platform or platforms? How resilient is the 
exploit against defenses such as address space randomization, 
non-executable memory, various canaries, and other memory 
integrity checks? How resilient can it become after a man-month 
of engineering effort by the exploit developer, and how qualified 
should this developer be to pull it off? 
For all of these, there appear to be neither accepted answers nor 
a common language to provide them. Our industry still lacks a 
consensus vocabulary to describe the generality of knowledge 
about a flaw as encapsulated in an exploit or an advisory. For 
example, has the primary effort been spent on the discovery of 
the flaw or on constructing the exploit machine? How likely is 
the flaw to be present and/or exploitable in other instances of 
related codebases? Is the exploitability of the flaw an (un)happy 
accident, or does it reveal a general principle applicable even 
beyond related codebases? 
Most of these answers become clear to experts after a care-
ful study of the exploit, but no textbook or other authoritative 
publication captures them, which makes it hard to explain the 
insights and the impact. Not surprisingly, it is a often a hard 
task to explain the impact of an “attack paper” to academics not 
versed in exploitation, as they, too, lack the terms for different 
degrees of impact and generality and have no referent in industry 
language. 
In short, a “Rainbow Series” for offensive computing suddenly 
sounds like a good idea. 
Common Criteria or FIPS for Offensive  
Computing?
Contrast the lack of terms to describe the generality, the resil-
iency, or the reliability of an exploit with the well-known criteria 
for government procurement of trusted computing systems, such 
as the Common Criteria or the FIPS certifications. Their dif-
ferent levels enumerate processes and methodologies applied in 
development of the software, with those at higher levels expected 
to provide relatively stronger assurance. A ranking, however 
imperfect, of software construction and testing methodologies is 
implied with respect to their relative power to provide assurance 
and verification. 
A similar ranking of attack and assessment methodologies may 
be possible, with respect to their power to reveal flaws. The 
similarity would, of course, extend to the cautions and provisos 
that apply to software construction methods, namely, that their 
ranking is relative rather than absolute, and provides evidence of 
effort invested rather than proof of security in any given sense. 
However, no such ranking is enshrined to date in a form avail-
able to industry outsiders. Some policy-makers may understand 
that certain grades and levels of offensive skills, activities, and 
artifacts are indispensable to security education of every com-
puter professional. They may understand that major advances 
in computer security have been made by the “Citizen Science” of 
hacking and only then adopted by industry or academia, and that 
curbing this citizen science by turning the respective activities 
into legal minefields will shrink the talent pool of “cyberdefend-
ers.” Yet, even so, they lack the concepts and terms to clearly 
distinguish activities they want regulated from the basic tools of 
the discipline. 
Moreover, perhaps their very ideas of what they want regulated 
will be changed once a proper language that shows the relative 
importance of offensive activities is available. 
Have We Learned the Lesson of the  
“Crypto Wars”?
The 1990s were a formative decade for the commercial Internet 
in the United States. Unfortunately, during this same time the 
US government policy was to treat strong encryption as a threat 
and to control implementations of certain cryptographic algo-
rithms as munitions, subject to vigorous enforcement of export 
regulations. In 1993, the author of the original PGP software, 
Phil Zimmerman, became the target of an FBI investigation for 
munitions export without a license, which lasted until 1996. At 
the same time, a series of failed technological “solutions” and 
mandates, such as the backdoored-by-design Clipper chip [11] 
and third-party key escrow were promoted as a legally safe way 
for the telecommunications industry to implement compliant 
encryption—which would have essentially amounted to pretend 
security. 
Export restrictions on artifacts of cryptography have doubtlessly 
harmed its practical progress. It’s not only that Johnny Q. Public 
still can’t encrypt [12], but John the Special Agent can’t encrypt 
either! [13] No matter where one stands on whether and how 
much the latter should be allowed to wiretap the former, John 
certainly has things to hide and in fact a duty to hide them—in 
which he is conspicuously failing. 
Could it be that both of these failures are due to the fact that 
deployment of strong crypto was stymied just when today’s 
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dominant communication protocols and infrastructure were 
rapidly developing? The fact is, these technologies ended up leav-
ing crypto behind and matured without incorporating cryptog-
raphy at their core. Superiors of John the Special Agent may have 
had visions of him using separate, special technologies vastly 
stronger than Johnny Q. Public’s and obtained from sources 
untainted by the weaknesses of public commodity communica-
tions; it appears their vision was wishful thinking. 
If having to pretend that poor cryptography was secure because 
practically exploring stronger crypto was a legal minefield led us 
to this point, where would pretending that computers are secure 
because of a likely minefield arising in exploitation engineer-
ing lead us from here? It will likely be worse, because the field 
of cryptography by the 1990s already had mature mathematical 
theory not easily undercut by the drag created on its engineering 
practice. Systems security, on the other hand, is only building up 
its theoretical foundations and is in need of much more feedback 
and generalization of its practice and its failures. 
If the practice of exploring the programming of programs’ faults 
becomes subject to regulation as vigorous as the 1990s “Crypto 
Wars,” will this practice develop enough to warn us before unse-
curable designs come to dominate critical infrastructure, power 
management, medicine, or even household appliances beyond 
any hope of replacement? Will we be surrounded by an Internet 
of Untrustworthy Things just as we are surrounded today by an 
Internet of Things that Can’t Keep a Secret (or at least are no 
help to an ordinary person for doing so)? 
Conclusions
Offensive computing—by now a research and engineering 
discipline that cuts across many technologies and abstraction 
layers—is central to the security and trustworthiness of com-
puter systems. However, the further one stands from security 
research, the less prominent the role of offensive computing 
appears. Even in the eyes of traditionally trained computer sci-
entists and engineers this role looks somewhat peripheral; in the 
view of policy-makers, offensive computing is often completely 
marginalized and confused with the criminality and ill intent of 
surveillance and repression. 
These diverging views of offensive computing are a clear and 
present danger to the development of the discipline, and thus to 
our hope for improving the trustworthiness of everyday comput-
ing. Without a concerted effort to claim its place, offensive com-
puting will end up being further marginalized, nearly impossible 
to practice outside of costly legal protection, and completely 
impossible to practice as a citizens’ science. 
To protect our discipline, we need to make sure that good 
approachable textbooks, or at least comprehensive dictionar-
ies, exist for it, that put it into proper perspective not only to 
experts but also to a much broader audience. Distracting as the 
task of writing these books may be, failure to communicate the 
importance of offensive research will be a lot more damaging in 
the long run, both to all of us and to the society that our research 
ultimately serves to protect. 
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